DO POLITICALLY CONNECTED BANKS PERFORM BETTER IN A DEMOCRATIC ENVIRONMENT?
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Abstract
This paper elucidates the intricate relationship among bank performance, political connections, and the democratic environment. The existing body of evidence is notably limited in illustrating the impact of a democratic environment on bank performance. Our study examines a sample of 397 banks spanning 14 countries and districts, encompassing both politically affiliated and non-politically affiliated banks in both democratic and non-democratic settings. The empirical findings reveal a reduction in non-performing loans but an escalation in loan loss provision within a democratic environment. This phenomenon may be attributed to the diminished level of financial constraints prevalent in democratic settings. Furthermore, our investigation reveals
that political connections exert a deleterious effect on the non-performing loans (NPL) ratio, coupled with a salutary impact on loan loss provision. Conclusively, our research identifies that the stock return of politically connected banks in democratic environments is inferior to their counterparts in non-democratic environments. Additionally, the non-performing loans ratio (NPL) of politically connected banks in democratic environments tends to be higher compared to their non-democratic counterparts. Conversely, the loan loss provision of politically connected banks in democratic environments tends to be lower than that in non-democratic environments. This nuanced analysis contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the interplay between democratic environments, political connections, and bank performance.
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